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ABSTRACT The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care has documented substan-
tial regional variation in health care utilization and spending, beyond what
would be expected from such observable factors as demographics and disease
severity. However, since these data are speciﬁc to Medicare, it is unclear to
what extent this ﬁnding generalizes to the private sector. Economic theory
suggests that private insurers have stronger incentives to restrain utilization
and costs, while public insurers have greater monopsony power to restrain
prices. We argue that these two differences alone should lead to greater
regional variation in utilization for the public sector, but either more or less
variation in spending. We provide evidence that variation in utilization in the
public sector is about 2.8 times as great for outpatient visits (p < 0.01) and
3.9 times as great for hospital days (p = 0.09) as in the private sector. Varia-
tion in spending appears to be greater in the private sector, consistent with the
importance of public sector price restraints.
T
here is considerable variation in health care utilization and spending
across geographic areas in the United States, but little evidence of cor-
responding differences in health outcomes or satisfaction with care.
1 This
variability is often cited as evidence that current levels of health care
spending reﬂect “ﬂat-of-the-curve” medicine, that is, treatment for which
the marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of care is approximately zero.
1. The main data source used to document regional variations is the Dartmouth Atlas of
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potential to increase the productivity of health care spending, and for this
reason they have ﬁgured prominently in the policy debate.
However, the evidence on regional variation is almost exclusively
limited to the public sector, because it relies on Medicare data. Less is
known about the corresponding patterns in the private sector. A venera-
ble literature in economics has argued that private ﬁrms and their man-
agers have stronger incentives to restrain costs and boost efﬁciency than
their public counterparts.
2 In the health insurance context, Medicare does
not face competition over premiums that might otherwise restrain its costs,
and unlike private sector firms, Medicare does not have direct residual
claimants whose standard of living improves with the efficiency of the
enterprise.
To develop the implications of these incentive differences, this paper
provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how regional variation in
health care differs across the public and the private sectors. We ﬁrst exam-
ine conceptually how private efforts to control costs within a region,
through selection of providers, might translate into differences in care
across regions. In particular, our analysis implies that utilization controls
within regions in the private sector should lead to lower regional variation
in the private sector than in Medicare. However, the implications for vari-
ation in spending are less clear, because Medicare may also be able to bet-
ter control prices through its greater monopsony power. If the private
sector controls utilization while the public sector controls prices, the result
is an ambiguous prediction for variation in spending.
We examine these implications empirically using individual-level data
on patients with heart disease, comparing utilization and spending on
patients who have private insurance with that on similar patients within
Medicare. Data on the former come from a large database of private sec-
tor medical claims, and on the latter from the Medicare Current Benefi-
ciary Survey. Both datasets include patient-level demographics and
co-morbidities, which allow us to identify regional variation distinct from
individual characteristics such as health. The focus on heart disease helps
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2. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) showed a greater incentive for shirking and inefﬁciency
in public enterprise, where managers’ and employees’ own standards of living are unaf-
fected by poor performance. De Alessi (1974a, 1974b) observed that inefﬁcient private ﬁrms
disappear, whereas inefﬁcient public ﬁrms can last for long periods. Spann (1977) argued
that private ﬁrms typically produce similar goods and services at much lower cost than their
public counterparts.
12178-06a_Philipson-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 326mitigate the confounding impact of regional differences in health status
on our analysis.
Our main object of interest is the regional variation in utilization and
spending across sectors that cannot be explained by variation in patient
characteristics. Our data suggest greater variation in utilization in the pub-
lic sector: our main analysis suggests that variation in the public sector is
about 2.8 times as great for outpatient visits (p < 0.01) and 3.9 times as
great for hospital days (p = 0.09) as in the private sector. There is some
evidence of greater variation for the number of hospitalizations in the pub-
lic sector, but this evidence is less robust. Prescription drug utilization
serves as our “placebo” case of insurance that was privately provided in
both samples during the period investigated. Significantly, and unlike
other types of medical care, drug utilization exhibits less variation among
Medicare patients. On the other hand, there is greater spending variation in
the private sector, suggesting the potential importance of monopsony
power in the public sector.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides the conceptual analy-
sis of how differing cost-control measures within a region might lead to
differences in regional variation in utilization and spending. Section II
reports our empirical analysis comparing regional variation in the public
and the private sectors. Section III discusses how our ﬁndings relate to the
existing literature on health care variation and the resulting policy implica-
tions. Section IV discusses some limitations of our analysis and presents
several robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. A Simple Analysis of Regional Variation in Utilization 
and Spending
This section presents a simple analysis of how private and public incen-
tives interact to create different degrees of regional variation in health care
utilization and spending between the public and the private sector.
3 A key
assumption is that private insurers have stronger incentives to restrain
costs and utilization than a public insurer such as Medicare. This assump-
tion is based on the literature demonstrating that, unlike public enterprises,
3. This analysis is general enough to include several possible sources of regional dif-
ferences, and in particular it allows for such differences to be efﬁcient. However, differ-
ences in liability (Kessler and McClellan 1996, 2002a, 2002b, Baicker and Chandra 2007)
or productivity (Chandra and Staiger 2007), for example, may imply differences in efﬁcient
levels of care.
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vate ﬁrms’ inefﬁciencies have direct impacts on the welfare of their own-
ers and employees (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, De Alessi 1974a). For
example, private payers may explicitly manage care and exert pressure on
providers through utilization review and case management. They can also
selectively contract with lower-cost providers, steer patients to preferred
providers, and exclude inefﬁcient doctors or hospitals. In addition, prior
authorization of large expenditures is prevalent in the private health insur-
ance sector, a practice that allocates major spending decisions to the payer
rather than the provider. Finally, private payers can steer patients toward
efﬁcient care through beneﬁts management—for example, by not covering
certain services unless certain clinical criteria are met. In what follows, we
use the shorthand of “utilization restrictions” (UR) to refer to all these
practices.
We interpret UR as a limit on the provision of treatments whose costs
exceed their benefits. This may still lead to regional variation in utiliza-
tion, because there is substantial heterogeneity among apparently simi-
lar patients in the efficacy of different treatments. Excessive care for
one patient may be cost-effective for another.
I.A. Causes of Sectoral Differences within Regions
We first consider the level of utilization in both the private and the
public sectors. Define y* as the efficient utilization level, that at which
marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost. Following the earlier literature, we
assume that private insurers have stronger incentives to limit utilization
that rises above this level. They do this through UR, which we assume
places an upper bound on utilization, yUR ≥ y*, and perfectly eliminates
inefﬁcient utilization above that level.
4 The assumption of full efﬁciency is
an analytical simpliﬁcation; the positive predictions do not depend on it,
and we do not emphasize the normative predictions.
Within any region there is a distribution of providers, who vary in the
level of care they would provide to an identical patient. We characterize
this distribution using the cumulative distribution function F(y) for the ran-
dom utilization variable Y. Private payers’ UR procedures limit utilization
and thereby truncate the support of the providers participating in their
plans. This results in the private mean utilization level, µ = E(YY ≤ yUR).
328 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
4. Imperfect UR has qualitatively similar theoretical implications. The difference is one
of degree rather than nature.
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public sector mean, µp = E(Y).
Now consider a pure increase in utilization, holding health status ﬁxed.
This can be represented as a rightward shift in the function F(y). Assuming
the efﬁcient level of utilization remains ﬁxed, the result is a greater differ-
ence in mean utilization across the two sectors, µp - µ. In other words, in
regions with providers who have greater tendencies toward inefﬁciency,
the difference in utilization between sectors will be larger.
The second key assumption is the presence of greater monopsony power
in the public sector. The result is greater restraint of prices, as opposed to
utilization, in the public sector. This affects the analysis of variation in
spending, which combines the utilization effect and the price effect. If
the government pays below-market prices through the exercise of either
monopsony power or direct price regulation, the cost curves will differ
across sectors. The result is depicted in figure 1. Average spending 
per patient in the private sector may exceed that in the public sector, if equi-
librium marginal cost in the public sector, MC
p*, is less than equilibrium
marginal cost in the private sector, MC*.
I.B. Causes of Sectoral Differences across Regions
Next consider how mean utilization for each sector might vary across
regions. Deﬁne the joint distribution G(µ
p, µ) of mean utilization levels
across regions. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the underlying distribution F(y)
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Figure 1. Variation in Spending Given Public Monopsony Power
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the relationship between changes in the public mean and the mean differ-
ence between sectors:
For example, consider the case of normally distributed public sector
utilization, Y ∼ N(µ
p, σ2). In this case, mean utilization in the private sec-
tor follows from the formula for the mean of a truncated normal random
variable, µ = µ
p +σ λ (α), where  is the inverse Mills ratio and
. This implies that the slope of the private mean as a function
of the public mean is less than unity or, equivalently, that the between-
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5. We use the fact that the derivative of the inverse Mills ratio with respect to α is
strictly between zero and 1, λ′(α) ∈ (0,1). (Sampford 1953).
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Figure 2. Comparing Differences in Utilization across Sectors
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raises the between-sector difference. This in turn implies that the variance
in the regional means in the public sector will exceed the variance in the
regional means in the private sector: V(µ
p) > V(µ).
This simple framework leads to several testable empirical predictions:
Private provision should lead to lower mean utilization and less variance in
mean utilization across regions, but not necessarily lower mean spending.
In addition, the difference in utilization between sectors is likely to rise
with the mean level of public utilization. Note that all these predictions
hold patient health status constant.
II. Empirical Analysis of Regional Variation across Sectors
In this section we describe our empirical analysis of regional variation in
the public and private sectors aimed at testing the implications discussed
above.
II.A. Data and Empirical Speciﬁcation
We compare regional variation between a sample of privately insured
patients and a sample of Medicare patients. The private data come from a
large database of health insurance claims. The data capture all health care
claims, including prescription drugs and inpatient, emergency, and ambu-
latory services, by employees and retirees while they are enrolled in the
health plans of 35 Fortune 500 ﬁrms. The analytical database integrates
component datasets of medical claims, pharmacy claims, and enrollment
records. This allows us to calculate spending and utilization for all services
provided to the patients over our study period. The enrollment records
allow us to identify basic demographics of the patients, including age,
sex, and some information on income.
6 Importantly for our purposes, the
data also include information on area of residence, coded by metropoli-
tan statistical area (MSA) and 3-digit zip code. This allows us to analyze
health care spending and utilization patterns at different levels of geo-
graphic aggregation.
Our Medicare sample is taken from the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS), which is administered to a nationally representative
sample of aged, disabled, or institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries.
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6. Our proxy for income is median household income at the 3-digit zip code level; this is
taken from the 2000 Census.
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facilities, are interviewed up to 12 times over a 4-year period. Institu-
tionalized respondents are interviewed by proxy. There is oversampling
of the disabled under 65 years of age and of the oldest old (85 years of
age or older). The MCBS uses a rotating panel design with limited 
periods of participation. Each fall a new panel is introduced with a target
sample size of 12,000 respondents, and each summer a panel is retired.
The MCBS data include detailed information on self-reported health
status, health care use and expenditure, insurance coverage, and demo-
graphic characteristics. Additional Medicare claims data for beneficia-
ries enrolled in fee-for-service plans are also incorporated to provide
more accurate information on health care use and expenditure. The
MCBS data do not include actual claims data on prescription drugs; all
information on prescription drug spending and utilization in the MCBS
is self-reported. This leads to a known undercount of drug spending in
the MCBS.
7
Both datasets include information on medical claims that is used to com-
pile utilization, spending, and baseline health information. That is, although
the MCBS contains a survey component, all data on spending and utiliza-
tion are compared with Medicare’s administrative claims data (Eppig and
Chulis 1997). However, since Medicare does not cover prescription drugs
over our sample period, this validation procedure applies to medical care
but not drugs. Finally, for both datasets we use information from 2000 to
2006. The one exception is prescription drug utilization and spending: to
abstract from the complexities of Medicare Part D’s introduction, we elim-
inate the 2006 data for these variables.
To mitigate differences in health status across sectors and regions, we
condition inclusion in the sample on a diagnosis of ischemic heart dis-
ease (IHD).
8 We also use the diagnosis codes on medical claims to iden-
tify whether patients were treated for any of 30 different conditions in a
332 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
7. When estimating the cost of Medicare Part D (for example), the Congressional Bud-
get Ofﬁce scaled the reported MCBS prescription drug spending up by 33 percent for the
noninstitutionalized population (Christensen and Wagner 2000).
8. Also called myocardial ischemia, IHD is characterized as reduced blood ﬂow to the
heart. In the private data we identify patients with IHD as those with at least one inpatient or
outpatient claim with a primary diagnosis ICD-9 code of 410.xx, 411.xx, 412.xx, 413.xx, or
414.xx. In the public data we identify patients based on self-reports of ever diagnosed
with heart disease. See the online data appendix (available on the Brookings Papers web-
page at www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea.aspx, under “Conferences and Papers”) for
more information.
12178-06a_Philipson-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 332calendar year.9 The claims-based measures of the number of diseases are
available in both the MCBS and the private health insurance data.
10 This
is important because unmeasured differences in severity across regions
could lead to spurious positive correlation between sectors.
The primary geographic unit of analysis for our study is the MSA. An
alternative candidate would be the hospital referral region (HRR), used by
the Dartmouth Atlas. However, HRRs are not reported in either of our
datasets, and the private sector data do not contain 5-digit zip codes,
which are required to construct an individual’s HRR. We restrict our sam-
ple to the 99 MSAs where we have the largest samples. MSAs are some-
what larger than HRRs, and this may compress the variation for both sectors
in our data.
Our ﬁnal sample contains 240,028 private patients and 24,800 public
patients.
11 Since there are many fewer public patients, it is important to cor-
rect for the effects of sample size on our estimates. We derive and report
these corrections in detail below.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics comparing demographic char-
acteristics in the public and the private samples. As one would expect, the
average age in the private sample is lower than in the sample of Medicare
patients, most of whom are older than 65. The private sample contains a
greater fraction of males, in part because it is inﬂuenced by current or past
employment status. (The private sample contains both active workers and
retirees receiving beneﬁts from their current or past employers.) Average
income is also higher in the private sample. The greater variance in income
for the public sample is likely due to the fact that income is reported indi-
vidually in the MCBS, but imputed at the local level in the private sample.
9. The specific conditions considered are essential hypertension, congestive heart
failure, diabetes, asthma, hypercholesterolemia, ulcer, depression, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, allergic rhinitis, migraine, arthritis, chronic sinusitis, anxiety disor-
der, cardiac disease, vascular disease, epilepsy, gastric acid disorder, glaucoma, gout, hyper-
lipidemia, irritable bowel syndrome, malignancy, psychotic illness, thyroid disorder,
rheumatoid arthritis, tuberculosis, angina, human immunodeﬁciency virus infection, ane-
mia, and stroke. Most co-morbidities are relatively uncommon, except for the ones involv-
ing heart disease (or risk factors for heart disease).
10. The MCBS also contains self-reports of a number of distinct health conditions, as
well as the individual’s self-reported general health status (coded 1 to 5, with 1 indicating
poor and 5 indicating excellent). Our regression analysis relies on the claims-based, rather
than self-reported, disease measures for both the public and the private samples. More details
appear in our online data appendix.
11. See the footnotes to tables 1 and 2 for a few sample size issues speciﬁc to certain
variables.
PHILIPSON, SEABURY, LOCKWOOD, GOLDMAN, and LAKDAWALLA 333
12178-06a_Philipson-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 333The table also compares the health of individuals in the two samples.
Since both samples are limited to individuals with a history of heart dis-
ease, we include a variable indicating the fraction of individuals who are
diagnosed with heart disease in a particular year. In all cases, the pres-
ence of disease is taken from claims rather than from self-reported data.
The incidence of heart disease is similar in the two samples: 0.32 in the
private sample and 0.37 in the public sample.
In addition, the table reports the average number of adverse health con-
ditions (out of the total of 30, including heart disease) per patient. As with
heart disease, the health conditions are determined using the ICD-9 diag-
nosis codes from medical claims in both the public and the private sam-
ples. Unsurprisingly, the elderly individuals in the public sample are much
sicker on average, with 2.9 adverse health conditions in the year compared
with 1.4 in the private sample.
As a matter of course, the public and the private samples are drawn
from different populations. We include a number of controls and analyses
designed to mitigate and test for the impact of these differences, but hetero-
geneity across samples remains a possibility. Later we discuss the sources
of heterogeneity, the methods we have employed to address them, and their
possible implications for the analysis.
II.B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for health care spending and
utilization in the public and the private samples aggregated over all regions
and patient characteristics. We present not only the mean and the standard
deviation but also the 25th-percentile, median, and 75th-percentile values.
Our utilization measures (all measured as yearly averages per patient)
334 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Table 1. Selected Patient Demographic and Health Characteristicsa
Private Public
Standard Standard 
Patient characteristic Mean deviation Mean   deviation
Age 55.4 7.1 78.2 7.9
Percent male 65 48 46 50
Income (thousands of 2004 dollars) 42.8 10.8 28.5 46.8
Percent with heart disease in year 32 47 37 48
No. of adverse health conditions 1.4 1.4 2.9 2.4
Sources: Data on private patients come from a modiﬁed version of the Ingenix Touchstone product.
Data on public patients come from the MCBS.
a. History of heart disease is self-reported in the public sample and identiﬁed using medical claims in the
private sample. The private sample has 240,028 observations and the public sample 24,800 observations.
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pitalizations, the number of outpatient visits, and the number of 30-day-
equivalent prescriptions in both samples. For spending, we record total
(inpatient plus outpatient), inpatient, and outpatient spending, as well as
spending on prescription drugs.
Utilization, in terms of hospitalizations, hospital days, and outpatient
visits, is lower for the private patients. Spending for this group also tends
to be lower. Total medical spending for individuals in the private plans is
$8,401 per year, compared with $10,245 for the Medicare patients—about
a 20 percent difference. The exception to the pattern is prescription drugs,
for which both utilization and spending are greater among private patients.
Figures 3 and 4 provide a broad sense of the variation present in our
samples. Figure 3 reports for both samples the estimated kernel densi-
ties of MSA-level deviations from the mean for both hospital days and
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Table 2. Distributions of Spending and Utilization Measuresa
Standard 25th  75th 
Measure Sample Mean deviation percentile Median percentile
Utilization (number per patient per year)
Hospitalizations Private 0.36 1.15 0 0 0
Public 0.57 1.14 0 0 1
Hospital days Private 1.23 7.13 0 0 0
Public 2.93 8.59 0 0 1
Outpatient visits Private 5.56 5.86 1 4 8
Public
b 8.59 11.05 1 5 12
Drug prescriptions
c Private 45.78 42.20 13 36 66
Public 35.45 29.93 14 29 50
Spending (thousands of 2004 dollars)
Total spending Private 8.40 22.98 0.56 2.10 6.88
Public 10.25 18.8 1.25 3.91 11.4
Inpatient spending Private 4.02 18.36 0 0 0
Public 4.94 13.21 0 0 4.65
Outpatient spending Private 4.38 9.83 0.54 1.85 4.86
Public 5.30 9.14 1.13 2.94 6.44
Prescription drug  Private 2.80 5.78 0.53 1.67 3.42
spending
c Public 1.92 2.05 0.58 1.39 2.63
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Figures are yearly averages during 2000–06 (2000–05 for drug prescriptions) for patients with a history
of heart disease, which is self-reported in the public sample and identiﬁed using medical claims in the
private sample. Except where noted otherwise, the private sample has 240,028 observations and the public
sample 24,800 observations.
b. Survey responses (used to cross-validate the claims data) were incomplete in 3,769 cases, so that the
public sample has 21,031 observations.
c. Because observations from 2006 are omitted, the private sample has 231,802 observations and the
public sample 21,140 observations. Number of prescriptions is in terms of 30-day-equivalents.
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Figure 3. Kernel Density Estimates of Regional Fixed Effects 
for Selected Utilization Measures
a
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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outpatient visits. Each data point underlying the kernel estimate is the dif-
ference between an MSA-level mean and the overall sample mean. For
both variables, the distributions appear to be tighter for the private than for
the public sample. However, these distributions are based on raw, unad-
justed numbers that do not account for disease or other covariates.
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Figure 4. Kernel Density Estimates of Regional Fixed Effects 
for Selected Spending Measures
a
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Estimated kernel densities of the deviation of mean inpatient and outpatient spending per patient per year 
across MSAs.
Density
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Figure 4 repeats this exercise for inpatient and outpatient spending.
Here the findings are decidedly more mixed. For outpatient spending the
distribution appears to be slightly tighter for the public sample. The fig-
ure for inpatient spending is harder to interpret visually, as the differences
in the densities are small and asymmetric. In any event, the differences
12178-06a_Philipson-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 337observable visually between the spending and the utilization distributions
suggest the possible importance of public sector price restraints, which
would lower spending variation even with greater variation in utilization.
Finally, ﬁgure 5 plots the relationship between deviations from the
MSA-level means for public and private hospital days. This is the empiri-
cal analogue to the theoretical relationship in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgure suggests
that mean private hospital days increase slightly with mean public hospital
days, but much less than one for one. This is consistent with there being
less regional variation in the private sector; we test this hypothesis more
formally in the following analyses.
II.C. Framework for Estimating Regional Variation
We are particularly interested in the between-MSA variance in spending
and utilization for the public and the private samples. We begin with the sim-
plest possible approach that evaluates the variance between MSAs in the
sample means. We then move to estimating the variance in regression-
adjusted means, which we estimate from regressions that control for various
factors that might also inﬂuence spending and utilization. In both cases we
account for the relative bias that is created by the substantial differences in
338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010




a. Each observation pairs the deviation for a single MSA from mean hospital days per patient per year in the 
public sample with that for the same MSA for the private sample. The line represents the fitted ordinary least 
squares regression line.
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than the private samples, there is greater sampling variance in the public
sector estimates and thus greater variation in the MSA-level means for
Medicare patients. To estimate the true between-sector differences in
regional variation, we estimate and remove the variability that is due to
sample size differences alone.
Formally, the observed regional variation within a sector is due to the
true variation and the sampling variance in estimating that variation.
Denote by µr the true mean for region r and by µ ˆr the corresponding sample
estimate, whether unconditional or regression-adjusted. The sample mean
is equal to the true mean plus sampling error, according to
The sampling error zr has zero mean, and the covariance of the sampling
error across regions is E(z, zs) =σ rs. Define  , the “grand 
mean” across regions. Similarly, deﬁne the corresponding sample analogue,
. Finally, define the average sampling error across regions, 
. The object of interest is the degree of regional variation in
the true MSA means,  , which has the sample ana-
logue .
The observed variation  is a biased estimator of RV, as a result of sam-
pling error in the estimates. Moreover, this bias is likely to be larger for our
public sector estimates because of the smaller public sector sample size,
which yields noisier estimates of public sector utilization. However, we can
recover a consistent estimate of the bias and correct for it, according to
In the appendix we show how to estimate this bias from sample vari-
ances and covariances. Our formula works for both the case of uncondi-
tional sample means and the case of regression-adjusted means. In the
simple case without covariance across regions or zero average error across
regions, this expression simply states that the observed variation is the true
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12178-06a_Philipson-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 339variation plus the average squared standard error. More generally, the more
precisely the sample means are estimated, the smaller is the bias correction.
In sum, the object of interest in our analysis is RV, which we estimate as
for both the public and the private sector. Using these estimates
of regional variation, we report both the ratio of public to private variation
and the difference between public and private variation. We construct stan-
dard errors around these by means of a bootstrap procedure, which sam-
ples individuals with replacement within each MSA, so that each bootstrap
sample contains exactly the same number of individuals in each MSA as
the original sample.
12 The bootstrap procedure reﬂects the nature of our
sample design. We regard the set of MSAs as ﬁxed but each sample within
an MSA as a random sample of that MSA’s population. Statistically, our
set of MSAs approximates a population, but we have samples within each
MSA.
Our regression-adjusted estimates employ a model with regional ﬁxed
effects that controls for disease severity and demographics.
13 For each sec-
tor s we estimate
Here Yirts represents some measure of utilization or spending by patient i in
region r at time t and in sector s. The vector X includes the following demo-
graphic characteristics for each patient: age, age squared, sex, income,
income squared, age and age squared interacted with sex, as well as dummy
variables for each of the adverse health conditions listed above. The terms
δts and δrs are sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects for year and MSA, respectively.
The sector-speciﬁc variance in the ﬁxed effect δrs is the regression-adjusted
analogue to the variance in the MSA-level sample means.
As a general matter, the covariates have relatively little predictive
power within MSAs but a fair amount between MSAs. Across all speci-
fications, for instance, the MSA means of the covariates explain about 
50 to 70 percent of the between-MSA variation in utilization and spend-
ing, in the sense of R
2.
Yirts s its s ts rs irts =+ + + + αβ δ δ 0 X  .
RV Bias   −
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12. The alternative block-bootstrap that samples MSAs with replacement generates
nearly identical inferences for statistical signiﬁcance in our analysis, and so does a “ﬂat”
bootstrap.
13. A possible alternative is a random-effects model, but the Hausman test rejected
this more efficient model in favor of the fixed-effects model in the majority of cases we
analyzed.
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Table 3 reports the estimated regional variance in four utilization
measures: number of hospitalizations, number of hospital days, number of
outpatient visits, and number of prescription drugs (in terms of 30-day-
equivalents). Again, prescription drug coverage is provided by the private
sector in both populations throughout the sample period, and therefore we
do not expect to see similar differences for prescription drugs as for the
other measures.
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Utilization measure Private Public Private Public
Unconditional means
Hospitalizations 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.009 −0.003 0.728
(0.003) (0.204)
Hospital days 0.322 1.016 0.230 0.659 0.429** 2.870*
(0.199) (1.017)
Outpatient visits 1.736 5.154 1.676 4.585 2.909*** 2.735***
(0.502) (0.323)
Drug prescriptions
d 72.746 32.758 70.090 28.403 −41.687*** 0.405***
(3.896) (0.043)
Regression-adjusted meanse
Hospitalizations 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.001 1.266
(0.002) (0.430)
Hospital days 0.169 0.610 0.080 0.313 0.233* 3.907*
(0.124) (1.684)
Outpatient visits 0.988 3.255 0.942 2.677 1.735*** 2.841***
(0.322) (0.379)
Drug prescriptions
d 29.190 25.856 27.086 21.131 −5.955* 0.780**
(3.130) (0.106)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors on the difference between public and private variation or
the ratio of public to private variation and are bootstrapped within MSAs, separately for public and pri-
vate patients, with 200 bootstrap draws. For both sectors, then, the number of patients in each region in
each bootstrapped sample is the same as the number of patients in the original sample. Asterisks indicate
differences statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero or ratios statistically signiﬁcantly different from
1 at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent level.
b. Variance in the regional means or ﬁxed effects of the utilization variables.
c. Unbiased measure of the true variance in the regional means or ﬁxed effects corrected for sampling
error, as described in the text and the appendix. All differences and ratios are based on these numbers.
d. 30-day-equivalents.
e. Estimates of regional ﬁxed effects on each utilization variable from a regression that includes as
other independent variables year ﬁxed effects, quadratic speciﬁcations of patient age and income, patient
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private sectors. The observed variation (ﬁrst two columns) is computed as
the average MSA-level deviation from the overall mean. The top panel
reports the variation based on unconditional means; in the bottom panel,
both the overall mean and each MSA-level mean are regression-adjusted,
as described above. The corrected variation (second two columns) is com-
puted by subtracting the expected bias due to sampling error, as described
above. The next column shows the absolute difference between the pub-
lic and private variances, and the last column the ratio of the variances.
Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences from zero for the
differences, and from unity for the ratios.
Variation in hospital days is about three times, and variation in out-
patient visits about two times, higher in the public sector. These differ-
ences are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or higher and
appear regardless of whether we adjust for covariates (although the mag-
nitudes differ somewhat). On the other hand, prescription drug utilization
exhibits statistically less variation in the Medicare population; this is
important because, again, even Medicare patients obtain their prescrip-
tion drug insurance privately in our sample. Finally, there is no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference in the variation for hospitalizations. It is likely
that more statistical power is needed to pin down this variance, in one
direction or the other. Overall, these results provide evidence suggesting
higher variance in the public sector, but for a few of the outcomes our sta-
tistical tests lack the power to generate deﬁnitive results.
Table 4 reports the estimated regional variance in four spending mea-
sures: total spending, inpatient spending, outpatient spending, and pre-
scription drug spending. The regression-adjusted estimates indicate that
outpatient spending exhibits only about 35 percent as much variation in the
public sector as in the private sector. Inpatient spending exhibits roughly
equal variation in the two sectors. Finally, prescription drug spending
varies less for Medicare patients. With that exception, these results are
quite different from the utilization results and suggest that price restraints
play a role in the public sector. In spite of greater variation in utilization,
the public sector exhibits less variation in spending.
III. Comparisons with Existing Literature
Regional variation in spending and utilization in the public sector has been
well documented in a literature that is almost 40 years old and well
accepted by the academic community. In that sense, our contribution is to
342 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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the existence of public sector variation.
Table 5 summarizes a few representative papers from this vast litera-
ture.
14 John Wennberg and Alan Gittelsohn (1973) provide an early exam-
ple. Their study analyzed variation across “hospital service areas,” a
precursor to the HRRs typically analyzed in the modern Dartmouth Atlas
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Spending measure Private Public Private Public
Unconditional means
Total medical  4.443 3.907 3.571 2.352 −1.219 0.659*
spending (0.981) (0.207)
Inpatient spending 1.634 1.587 1.109 0.842 −0.266 0.760
(0.416) (0.247)
Outpatient spending 1.263 1.048 1.082 0.634 −0.447 0.586
(0.355) (0.266)




Total medical  2.890 2.782 2.111 1.463 −0.647 0.693
spending (0.728) (0.258)
Inpatient spending 1.186 1.357 0.698 0.695 −0.004 0.995
(0.324) (0.298)
Outpatient spending 0.924 0.628 0.758 0.265 −0.494* 0.349**
(0.261) (0.272)
Prescription drug  0.251 0.086 0.214 0.064 −0.150*** 0.300***
spending (0.043) (0.082)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Spending is measured in 2004 dollars. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors on the difference
between public and private variation or the ratio of public to private variation and are bootstrapped within
MSAs, separately for public and private patients, with 200 bootstrap draws. For both sectors, then, the
number of patients in each region in each bootstrapped sample is the same as the number of patients in
the original sample. Asterisks indicate differences statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero or ratios
statistically signiﬁcantly different from 1 at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent level.
b. Variance in the regional means or ﬁxed effects of the spending variables.
c. Unbiased measure of the true variance in the regional means or ﬁxed effects corrected for sampling
error, as detailed in the text and the appendix. All differences and ratios are based on these numbers.
d. Estimates of regional ﬁxed effects on each spending variable from a regression that includes as other
independent variables year ﬁxed effects, quadratic speciﬁcations of patient age and income, patient sex,








14. For useful summaries from both the economic and the clinical literatures on geographic
variation in health care, see Wennberg and Cooper (1998), Phelps (2000), Fisher and others
(2003a, 2003b), Chandra and Staiger (2007) and Sutherland, Fisher, and Skinner (2009).























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12178-06a_Philipson-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 345of Health Care studies. The table also lists a couple of important studies
that use states or MSAs. It is important to recognize this difference when
comparing our MSA-level analysis with HRR-level analyses elsewhere,
and it is important for future work to assess the potential implications of
this difference.
The 2008 Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care reports that average spending
on health care in the last 2 years of life (for deaths occurring from 2001 to
2005) ranged from a high of $59,379 in New Jersey to $32,523 in North
Dakota (Wennberg and others 2008). This range, from 28 percent above to
30 percent below the national average, is similar to the range of quantity
utilization reported across MSAs by MedPac: from 39 percent above the
national average in Miami to 25 percent below in rural Hawaii (Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission 2009).
These variations are not fully explained by factors such as age, insur-
ance coverage, average income, and rates of illness or disease. David
Cutler and Louise Sheiner (1999) investigate the extent to which variation
in spending across HRRs can be explained by regional differences in ill-
ness, in the demand for health (for example, as measured by income and
race), or in “exogenous differences in the structure of medical care mar-
kets” (for example, in the ratio of generalists to specialists). They find
that regional demographics can explain about 70 percent of the variation
in medical spending across regions, but the unexplained variation remains
large. For example, when differences in demographics and the illness of the
population are accounted for, bringing Medicare spending down to the level
of the 10th-percentile region would reduce total spending by 15 percent.
Perhaps the existing study most closely related to ours is that of Michael
Chernew and others (2010), who compare HRR-level variations in Medi-
care against those in a sample of large firms in the Thomson Reuters
(Medstat) MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database. They
estimate that the geographic variation in private sector spending is greater
than that in Medicare spending (coefﬁcient of variation of 0.21 versus 0.16).
This is consistent with our ﬁndings for spending. They focus less on varia-
tion in utilization, although they do report a positive correlation between
Medicare and non-Medicare inpatient days.
IV. Limitations of Our Analysis
There are several empirical questions that our data cannot address but that
should be addressed in future work. The populations of privately insured
and publicly insured patients differ, because the latter have often opted out
346 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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not clear a priori. Fee-for-service Medicare patients are likely to be sicker
than their counterparts in private Medicare health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs), because HMOs attempt to select healthier patients (Morgan
and others 1997). On the other hand, the privately insured nonelderly may
also be healthier than the nonelderly overall, if private health insurers
select against the sickest patients for similar reasons. The link between
health insurance and employment in the nonelderly population adds fur-
ther complexity, as those who are eligible for employment-based health
insurance may be richer or healthier, or both, than their peers. Finally,
the fact that our private sector data are based only on employees of large
(Fortune 500) ﬁrms adds a further dimension of selection.
We ran several supplementary analyses to investigate some of these
issues, but our data lack the power to reach deﬁnitive conclusions across
the board. First, we narrowed the age range of our comparisons, to mitigate
some of the differences in health status. We compared 60- to 64-year-olds
in the commercially insured population with 66- to 70-year-olds in the fee-
for-service Medicare population. As this restriction further reduces the
sample, we limit our analysis to the 70 MSAs for which we have at least
25 observations in both samples.
Table 6 reports the result for the samples with the narrow age ranges.
Generally, the point estimates based on these restricted age ranges are
similar to those based on the full sample, but the precision of the esti-
mates declines enough to eliminate statistical significance. The point
estimates indicate that variation in the public sector is about 5.1, 3.4, and
1.2 times that in the private sector for hospital days, outpatient visits, and
hospitalizations, respectively. As in the analysis based on the full sample,
variation in prescription drug use is smaller in the public sector, about
53 percent as large as variation in the private sector.
Next we investigated the issue of selection based on employment by
comparing our privately insured sample with Medicare patients who also
have coverage from an employer. If an individual has such coverage, we
know that he or she was employed and privately insured at one point.
Roughly 35 percent of Medicare enrollees in our sample also have
employer-provided coverage. They are slightly younger (averaging 
77 years, compared with 79 years for those without such coverage),
richer (average income is 58 percent higher), and more likely to be male 
(52 percent versus 40 percent) than the average Medicare enrollee. Hav-
ing employer coverage is associated with very small differences in the
fraction of total expenses paid for by Medicare: Medicare pays 39 percent
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those with such coverage. The lack of a disparity is due to the fact that
once an elderly Medicare beneﬁciary retires, the employer-provided cov-
erage becomes secondary to Medicare. In our data just 9 percent of indi-
viduals in the Medicare sample with employer coverage are working, so
for the vast majority Medicare is the primary payer. It thus seems reason-
able to assume that Medicare is the primary driver of resource allocation
for these individuals. A number of MSAs are left with very small samples
after this restriction, so we limit our analysis to the 77 MSAs where we
have at least 50 observations in both samples.
These results are presented in table 7. Again, the point estimates are
similar to those based on the full sample, but the precision of the estimates
declines enough to eliminate much of the statistical signiﬁcance. The point
estimates indicate that variation in the public sector is about 4.1, 3.8, and
1.6 times that in the private sector for hospital days, outpatient visits, and
hospitalizations, respectively. The greater variation in outpatient visits in
the public sample is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The other
348 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Table 6. Regional Variation in Regression-Adjusted Mean Utilization, 




measure Private Public Private Public
Hospitalizations 0.015 0.035 0.011 0.014 0.003 1.244
(0.010) (0.921)
Hospital days 0.258 2.038 0.130 0.656 0.526 5.060
(0.886) (4.134)
Outpatient visits 1.460 7.207 1.335 4.524 3.190 3.390
(2.316) (1.695)
Prescriptions 52.869 47.198 46.741 24.765 −21.975** 0.530
(11.090) (0.209)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The private sample is restricted to patients aged 60 to 64 and the public sample to patients aged 66 to 70.
Both samples are restricted to include only the 70 MSAs with at least 25 observations in both samples.
The private sample has 67,414 observations and the public sample 3,568 observations. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors on the difference between public and private variation or the ratio of pub-
lic to private variation and are bootstrapped within MSAs, and separately for public and private patients,
with 200 bootstrap draws. For both sectors, then, the number of patients in each region in each boot-
strapped sample is the same as the number of patients in the original sample. Asterisks indicate dif-
ferences statistically significantly different from zero or ratios statistically significantly different
from 1 at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent level.
b. Variance in the regional means or ﬁxed effects of the utilization variables.
c. Unbiased measure of the true variance in the ﬁxed effects corrected for sampling error, as detailed in
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tion drug use is slightly lower in the public sector, about 93 percent as
large as in the private sector.
V. Concluding Remarks
It has long been recognized that public and private enterprises face differ-
ent incentives to control costs. This paper has analyzed these differences in
the health insurance context, along with their implications for variation in
care. Public payers are likely able to restrain prices better than private pay-
ers but have weaker incentives to control costs through utilization controls.
As a result, one might expect greater variation in utilization for the public
sector, but the effects on total spending are ambiguous. Using samples of
heart disease patients, we presented empirical evidence consistent with
these implications.
Further research should focus more closely on the issue of whether and
to what extent variations across sectors are the result of differences in the
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Table 7. Regional Variation in Regression-Adjusted Mean Utilization, 





measure Private Public Private Public
Hospitalizations 0.006 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.003 1.572
(0.004) (0.984)
Hospital days 0.144 0.709 0.049 0.198 0.149 4.058
(0.240) (3.861)
Outpatient visits 3.774 4.462 0.911 3.438 2.527*** 3.774***
(0.518) (0.614)
Prescriptions 28.982 34.778 26.885 25.107 −1.778 0.934
(6.032) (0.213)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The public sample is restricted to patients who report at least some form of private, employer-
provided insurance coverage. Both samples are restricted to include only the 77 MSAs that have at least
50 observations in both samples. The private sample has 202,202 observations and the public sample
8,416 observations. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors on the difference between public and pri-
vate variation or the ratio of public to private variation and are bootstrapped within MSAs, and separately
for public and private patients. For both sectors, then, the number of patients in each region in each
bootstrapped sample is the same as the number of patients in the original sample. Asterisks indicate
differences statistically significantly different from zero or ratios statistically significantly different
from 1 at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent level.
b. Variance in the regional means or ﬁxed effects of the utilization variables.
c. Unbiased measure of the true variance in the ﬁxed effects corrected for sampling error, as detailed in
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also needed to assess whether our basic ﬁndings can be generalized across
other disease categories and geographical classiﬁcations. In addition, the
analysis of health outcomes must be integrated into the analyses of utiliza-
tion and of spending. As a related point, although we have focused on esti-
mated variations, further research should be conducted into the sources of
the mean differences in utilization and spending. Finally, and perhaps most
important, research is needed to draw out the normative implications of
variations in care both within and between sectors.
The normative implications of variation in care are not straightforward,
in spite of the conventional wisdom that greater variation implies inefﬁ-
ciency. On the one hand, the literature has consistently found that areas
exhibiting higher utilization of health care services do not exhibit demon-
strably better outcomes for patients (Fisher and others 2003a). This has led
many to conclude that these areas are practicing “ﬂat-of-the-curve” medi-
cine, where the marginal benefit approaches zero. However, Amitabh
Chandra and Douglas Staiger (2007) demonstrate that productivity spill-
overs and specialization can explain regional variation in the utilization of
intensive procedures, without resorting to inefﬁciency. Most notably, their
model can reconcile the seemingly contradictory evidence that intensive
treatments such as most surgery are often highly effective at the individual
level, but that regions using these treatments more intensively do not have
better average health outcomes. Chandra and Staiger observe that regions
specializing in intensive treatment will ﬁnd it optimal to provide that treat-
ment to more patients; therefore, the marginal patient in such regions will
be less suited to it than the marginal patient elsewhere. This mitigates the
greater beneﬁts of intensive treatment.
For this and other reasons, the efﬁciency implications of variation in
care require a more careful analysis. Even in our simple framework, the
normative impact of variation is unclear. For instance, if the private sector
is pricing and producing efﬁciently, then the theory suggests that the pub-
lic sector is engaging in inefﬁciently high utilization and inefﬁciently low
pricing. On the other hand, if private sector prices are too high or if utiliza-
tion is too low, then the effects of public insurance may actually represent
second-best improvements to welfare. Evidently, it is important to investi-
gate the baseline efﬁciency properties of the private health insurance mar-
ket and to characterize how these are affected by the presence of publicly
ﬁnanced health insurance.
Regardless of the conclusions, normative analysis of this issue will likely
generate a number of important policy implications. Many have noted that
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often interpreted as part of the value generated by centralized insurance.
This is a typical ﬁnding when one is comparing a centralized with a decen-
tralized model, but it could also be explained by the cost of administering
utilization controls in the private sector. If so, any efficiency benefits of
utilization controls would need to be weighed against these administrative
costs. The beneﬁts generated by administrative costs are often neglected in
the policy debate, as are related issues such as the deadweight costs of the
tax revenue required to fund public enterprise, the efﬁciency gains of mar-
keting activities by private ﬁrms, and higher rates of fraud in the public
Medicare system. The last of these is directly related to lax utilization con-
trols. A fuller analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of public versus private
health insurance is needed.
The relative merits of public enterprise have a number of policy impli-
cations. The ﬁrst concerns the appropriate size of Medicare Advantage,
which operates through publicly provided premium subsidies to private
HMOs. Medicare Advantage plans are not directly comparable to private
payers, because they compete on quality rather than price, as long as there
is no price competition through competitive bidding for plan members.
Thus differences in incentives for utilization control operate through the
need to enhance quality, subject to available premium resources, or result
from residual claims on proﬁts. Future research needs to investigate more
carefully the differences and similarities in cost-control measures from this
type of coverage and their effects on regional variations and efﬁciency.
The second implication regards the timely issue of comparative effective-
ness research (CER), which has been offered as a means of raising health
care quality and reducing costs. The rationale for CER is to generate better
evidence, and to disseminate it to patients, payers, and providers, about
what works and does not work in health care. Indeed, a common motiva-
tion for the use of CER is to reduce cost inefﬁciencies due to regional dif-
ferences in care. Awareness of CER has been heightened recently by its
signiﬁcant public subsidization through the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009.
15 An overriding question raised by our analysis is
whether regional variation in care occurs because of a lack of information
or a lack of incentives for utilization control in the public sector.
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15. The explicit use of comparative effectiveness assessments is much more common
outside the United States, particularly in the European Union. However, this is a relatively
recent trend: no European countries formally required economic assessments for pricing and
reimbursement decisions as of 1993, but a majority had such a policy either in place or in
development by 1999 (Drummond and others 1993, 1999).
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ences in incentives across the public and the private sectors or to the corre-
sponding implications for health care variation. The regional variations
documented in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care have led several promi-
nent researchers to conclude that high-use regions ought to model them-
selves after their low-use peers (Fisher, Bynum, and Skinner 2009). Our
study suggests the importance of research focusing on another, different
question: whether or not public sector health insurers ought to model them-
selves after their peers in the private sector.
APPENDIX
Sampling Error in Estimation of Regional Variation
In the text we outlined our approach for obtaining a consistent estimate
of regional variation, deﬁned as
In this appendix we show how we solve for the bias in the sample analogue,
, and estimate it consistently using the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimates. Recall the deﬁnitions from the text: µr
is the true population ﬁxed-effect parameter for region r, µ ˆr is the corre-
sponding sample estimate, and zr is a mean-zero sampling error with covari-
ance across regions E(zrzs) =σ rs. The sample estimate is the true value plus
sampling error,
Define  , the mean regional fixed effect across regions; 
, its sample analogue; and  , the average sam-
pling error across regions.
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rather than random effects, to move the expectations operator inside the
summation. Expanding the right-hand side of the expression results in
Since µr and µ – are both scalars, this simpliﬁes to
The distributional assumptions on z imply that E(zr) = E(z –) = 0. Therefore,
we can write
To characterize the bias, note that
which we can write in terms of the variance and covariance parameters as
The bias due to sampling variance is equal to the above expression,
averaged across all regions. A consistent estimate of the bias can be cal-
culated by summing up and taking the appropriate averages of estimated
variances of and covariances between the estimated regional ﬁxed effects.
The more precisely the regional ﬁxed effects are estimated, the smaller is
the bias correction.
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Comment and Discussion
COMMENT BY
DAVID M. CUTLER The issue of geographic variation in medical care
spending played an important role in the recent health care reform debate.
Supporters of reform cited the wide variation in spending across U.S.
regions as evidence that care is inefﬁciently provided. According to a
widely cited analysis by Elliott Fisher and others (2003), “If the United
States as a whole could safely achieve spending levels comparable to those
of the lowest-spending regions, annual savings of up to 30% of Medicare
expenditures could be achieved.” One-third of the nation’s medical spend-
ing amounts to over $700 billion annually—a huge savings.
Few dispute that health care is characterized by signiﬁcant inefﬁciency,
but how best to limit that inefﬁciency is a subject of great debate. Broadly
speaking, there are two approaches. The first is to use consumer demand
to limit wasteful care. In this approach, informed, incentivized con-
sumers would shop for efficient care just as they do for other products.
Private insurers responding to this demand would then squeeze out exces-
sive spending. The main barriers to this favorable competition, proponents
argue, are the tax subsidy favoring the purchase of more generous insur-
ance by employers in the private sector, and the lack of good stewardship
of Medicare and Medicaid in the public sector. In the latter category, the
biggest issue is the absence of a proﬁt incentive to manage care for the
bulk of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees.
The second approach focuses on the supply side. Here the key issue is
how physicians and hospitals are paid for treating people. Doctors are
reimbursed more for providing more care, but not for providing higher-
quality care or limiting the need for care in the ﬁrst place. Thus surgeons
are paid for performing operations, but primary care physicians are not
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paid for the management involved in preventing surgery. Care will exceed
the optimum because quantity is favored over quality.
These two theories have very different implications for health care
reform. In the demand-side view, competition among insurers is the ideal,
and private markets are preferred to public programs. Thus Medicare
would do better to encourage entry by private plans than to focus on
improving the fee-for-service system. In the supply-side view, the key is
changing the ﬁnancial incentives for providers. This is best accomplished
by reforming the payment system in the traditional Medicare program, and
working to spread that change throughout the health care system. Thus
encouraging more private plans would not be a helpful step for Medicare,
and might be harmful.
This paper by Tomas Philipson and his colleagues is directed at this
debate. The idea behind the paper is to examine whether private insurers
do a better job at limiting health care utilization than Medicare does.
Evidence that private plans are better at rationing care would support
the demand-side view of reform. The test that the authors propose is to
look at the variability of care across a sample of metropolitan statistical
areas. If private plans are better at eliminating excessive care, they should
have lower spending in metropolitan areas where care is otherwise 
overprovided—defined in the paper as areas where Medicare fee-for-
service costs are higher. Analytically, this would show up as lower vari-
ance of health care utilization across areas in the private sector.
Philipson and his coauthors test this hypothesis using data on patients
with ischemic heart disease, a condition that bridges the over- and under-
65 populations. They reach two conclusions. First, they show that the vari-
ation in two measures of utilization—the number of hospital days and
outpatient visits—is indeed greater in Medicare than in private insurance.
For both measures, the standard deviation across areas in Medicare is
three times that across areas in private insurance. Interestingly, the average
number of hospital stays per patient is not more variable in Medicare;
rather, it is the average length of stay (hospital days) that is more vari-
able. Private insurers seem better at getting people out of the hospital sooner.
In contrast, however, spending is much less variable across areas than is
utilization. Areas with low private sector utilization have higher private sec-
tor prices than areas with higher utilization. This is not true in Medicare,
where prices are set nationally.
Whether one concludes from these ﬁndings that the public or the pri-
vate sector is more efﬁcient depends on whether one puts more weight on
utilization or on spending. Since greater utilization has a real resource
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(if one excludes the deadweight loss of raising tax revenue to support
the public programs), one might imagine that lower utilization at higher
prices is preferable to higher utilization at lower prices. This logic favors
the private sector. On the other hand, the additional care that people
receive in Medicare is not necessarily wasteful. If the added care in the
public sector has high marginal value, more care received at lower prices
would be preferred to less care at higher prices, and Medicare would be
judged superior.
A priori, it is not clear whether the additional care provided in high-
utilization areas is worth the cost. If health care obeyed standard market
theory, the care that well-informed patients facing price incentives decide
not to purchase (either when the care is offered, or earlier, when they choose
a less generous insurance plan) would be the care that is least valued. But
patients are not always sure about what care they need, and providers
have imperfect incentives to fully inform them. Thus one natural exten-
sion of the paper would be to compare health outcomes in the public and
private sector, to see whether patients get care of real value. The data that
Philipson and his coauthors employ do not include ideal measures of out-
comes, but some outcome assessment is possible: for example, one could
examine the rate at which patients in the sample are later admitted to a hos-
pital with cardiac complications.
There is also an obvious alternative explanation for the greater geo-
graphic variance of utilization in Medicare than in private insurance: health
status may vary more in the Medicare population than in the privately
insured population. To control for this variation, Philipson and coauthors
perform a variety of risk adjustments. Having already limited the sample to
people with ischemic heart disease, they further control for other condi-
tions that those patients may have. But these adjustments are imperfect, as
any risk adjustment is.
The reason to suspect that greater variation in health status in the
Medicare population is important is that the reduction in variation in the
private sector occurs at both the top and the bottom end of the utilization
distribution. The theory that the authors put forward is that private insur-
ers should ration care more when underlying utilization is higher. Thus
private sector utilization should be disproportionately lower in high-use
areas. That is the point of ﬁgure 2 in the paper. In contrast, however, their
ﬁgure 3 shows a uniform reduction in the standard deviation of care in the
private sector. That is, high-utilization areas are less far above the mean in
private insurance, but low-utilization areas are less far below the mean.
358 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
12178-06b_Philipson comments_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:19 PM  Page 358COMMENT and DISCUSSION 359
The reason why care in low-utilization areas would be greater in the pri-
vate sector is not clear. One might imagine that providers are skimping on
the Medicare population in low-utilization areas, and that private insurers
encourage more care than providers would otherwise prescribe. But the
analysis by Fisher and his coauthors does not suggest signiﬁcant underuse
of care in the low-spending Medicare areas, nor do patients report them-
selves less satisﬁed in those areas. Given the approximately proportional
reduction in variation in the private sector compared with Medicare, it
seems that a theory of variation in underlying health status garners at least
as much support as a theory of efﬁcient rationing.
This conclusion is buttressed by a consideration of aggregate differ-
ences between Medicare and private insurance. An analysis of aggregate
spending data does not suggest any superiority of private insurers in limit-
ing cost increases over time. My ﬁgure 1 shows annual data on growth of
real Medicare spending per beneﬁciary and private insurance premiums
per enrollee. In each case the spending measure is limited to a common set
of beneﬁts, including hospital inpatient and outpatient care and physician
services. The two series generally mirror each other. Cost growth was high
in the 1980s, low in the 1990s, and resurgent in the 2000s. Overall, cost
increases were greater in the private sector (averaging 4.9 percent per year)
than in Medicare (3.7 percent).
Figure 1. Growth in Real Spending per Enrollee in Private Health Insurance 
and Medicare, 1981–2008
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ums rose more rapidly than Medicare spending in the 1980s, when prospec-
tive payment was introduced in the public sector. The managed care era of
the 1990s saw moderately slower cost growth in the private sector than in
Medicare. Managed care used the type of utilization restrictions that Philip-
son and his coauthors argue are effective.
But a good share of these utilization controls were reversed in the
2000s, when a backlash against managed care caused insurers to change
their practices. Requirements for prior authorization were substantially
weakened, and ﬁnancial incentives for providers to perform less care were
loosened. Further, providers responded to the presence of managed care by
merging, and this led to higher prices in the private sector, where prices
are ﬂexible. The result was a decade of much higher private sector cost
increases than Medicare cost increases.
The data that Philipson and coauthors analyze are from the 2000s. Fig-
ure 1 shows the peculiarity of the case that they make. They argue for the
superiority of private utilization controls using data from a time when
private sector controls on utilization were falling and costs were rising
rapidly. It may be that people were wrong to reject the managed care stric-
tures of the 1990s, and that a return to those practices would be beneﬁcial.
But few people argue that the version of managed care that prevailed in the
2000s is a sustainable model.
In the recent health care reform debate, the conclusion that public and
private insurance were relatively similar in cost growth was more com-
monly accepted than the argument that private insurers were superior in
reducing excess utilization. Added to this was the sense that private insur-
ers engaged in signiﬁcant and costly risk selection, wasting money and
making insurance difﬁcult to obtain. Thus, regulating private insurers to
limit risk selection is a signiﬁcant element of the recently enacted Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), whereas opening up new
markets in Medicare for private insurers is not. Indeed, the act reduces
Medicare payments to private insurers. In its place are a series of pilot pro-
grams and demonstration projects aimed at reforming the incentives in the
existing fee-for-service program.
Whether the strategy underlying the PPACA is the right one or not will
be determined in the next few years. If reform fails, it may be because pri-
vate insurers were strangled too tightly. If so, this paper may point the way
to a future reform. But for now we are likely to see tighter restrictions on
private insurance before any signiﬁcant new utilization controls.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Christopher Sims raised the question of
how secondary private insurance ﬁts into the classiﬁcation of public ver-
sus private. Many Medicare beneﬁciaries have supplementary coverage,
and whether an individual has it or not could affect his or her utilization
choices. If there is regional variation in the share or beneﬁciaries using
Medicare supplements, it could be affecting the paper’s results.
Daniel Sacks asked whether the privately covered individuals in the
sample were truly representative of people with private coverage gener-
ally. If the sample is drawn from Fortune 500 companies only, their health
insurance plans may be better than the average private plan and have bet-
ter, or at least different, cost management. He also wondered what incen-
tives the executives of both public and private insurance plans actually
face and whether they are as different as the paper assumes.
David Romer observed that the theory laid out in the paper makes a
clear prediction of where the expected change in the distribution of ﬁxed
effects ought to appear: The incentives facing the private sector should
lead to compression of the upper tail of the distribution in that sample but
not the lower tail, yet no such pattern is visible in the data.
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